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INTRODUCTION 
Russia and Norway share a border of 196 km in the north, with Kirkenes as the largest 
city on the Norwegian side and Murmansk on the Russian side. This border, which was 
established in 1826, is not only a border between two countries, but also the border 
separating the Schengen Area and NATO on the Norwegian side from Russia on the 
other, giving it enhanced strategic and symbolic importance. 
During the Cold War, relations between Norway and the Soviet Union were 
strained, and around the time of Détente in the 1970s, the ‘Question of the Barents Sea’ re-
surfaced as one of the most important unresolved issues between the two countries. The 
dispute concerned the delimitation of the maritime boundary between the Soviet Union 
and Norway. The break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991 brought about a set of new 
opportunities for the two countries to increase cooperation and a possibility of settling 
this long-lasting conflict.  
Although the border region has generally been calm, with strong people-to-people 
connections in the area, there have been occasional signs of increasing tensions between 
the two countries over the years. The 2005 Electron episode was a case in point: The 
catching of the Russian trawler ‘Electron’ following its fishing with illegal equipment 
outside Spitsbergen led to a five-day chase when it set off for Russian waters with two 
Norwegian inspectors still on board.1 The event sparked a diplomatic crisis between the 
two countries, and a dispute over the jurisdiction governing Arctic waters. Norway, on the 
                                                        
1 Clare Bigg, 'Russia: Trawler Escapes Norwegian Coast Guard While Still Carrying Inspectors', Radio Liberty 
Free Europe <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1062253.html> [accessed 15 March 2016] (para. 1 of 
14). 
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other side, has hosted the annual2 NATO drill ‘Cold Response’ in Northern Norway, with 
up to 9000 soldiers from 14 countries, much to the dislike of Russian authorities.3  
After a prolonged period of Barents Sea negotiations and in the midst of shifting 
tensions in the north, the boundary dispute was suddenly settled under the Medvedev 
presidency, which gave rise to the question of timing: Why was the treaty concluded 
precisely in 2010? Which factors contributed to the rather sudden resolution of the 
dispute? With shifting Russian-Western relations during the preceding Putin presidency, 
can the dispute resolution in the Barents Sea be seen as a change in Russian foreign policy 
towards a more cooperative path under Medvedev?  
This paper aims to analyse Norwegian-Russian relations during the presidency of 
Dmitrii Medvedev from 2008 to 2012, with a particular focus on the main dispute 
between the two countries the last decades: the Barents Sea with respect to the 2010 
Boundary Treaty. This paper is structured as follows. While it is outside the scope of this 
article to discuss the multitude of organisations, agreements and treaties governing the 
Euro-Arctic region, a brief survey of the organisations covering the Barents area is 
presented in a first section. Then a section on developments in Russian foreign policy and 
the Medvedev presidency follows. The paper sheds light on Russia’s economic and 
geopolitical interests in the Barents region. Doing so, it argues that the signing of the 
Treaty can be seen as an example of a change in Russian foreign policy under Medvedev 
to a more accommodating course with the West. The successful dispute settlement 
concerning the boundary delimitation was an illustration thereof, through peaceful 
negotiations based on international laws. As the focus is on the foreign policy of Russia, it 
will only briefly cover domestic factors in Russia and Norwegian foreign policy as factors 
contributing to the dispute resolution. 
I. THE BARENTS REGION AND THE ARCTIC 
The Barents region is an area above the Arctic Circle that encompasses the North-West 
of Russia and the northernmost regions of the Nordic countries. The Barents Sea, which 
is sometimes referred to as the Euro-Arctic Sea, lies north of the Norwegian-Russian 
                                                        
2 Biennial as of 2011. 
3 Thomas Nilsen, 'Large NATO exercise starts in Northern Norway', Barents Observer 
<http://barentsobserver.com/en/sections/articles/large-nato-exercise-starts-northern-norway> [accessed 
16 March 2016] (para. 1 of 9). 
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border, with vast marine resources and high estimates of oil and gas deposits. For political 
reasons that will be discussed in further detail in this paper, the Barents Sea is not 
included in the Barents Region.  
The organisations in the Barents region constitute the formal framework for 
governance on a regional level and institutionalize the cooperation. The multilateral 
cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region is coordinated through the Barents Euro-
Arctic Council, which was established in 1993 between Russia and the Nordic states and 
supported by the International Barents Secretariat.4 The organisation’s aim is to promote 
cooperation in environmental protection, fishery and resource management in the Barents 
Region. However, due to the dispute of the Barents Sea delimitation between Russia and 
Norway, the Barents Sea is not included in this cooperation framework. Russia held the 
chairmanship of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council from 2007 to 2009, coinciding with the 
handover from Putin to Medvedev. In addition there is the Arctic Council, focusing on 
the wider Arctic area and includes all Arctic states plus observers, working especially on 
environmental and indigenous issues.5 Russia held the chairmanship of the Arctic Council 
under the Putin presidency from 2004–2006. 
II. THE IDEOLOGIES AND CONCEPTS BEHIND MOSCOW’S POLICY  
Under the presidency of Boris El’tsin and Vladimir Putin, the making of Russian foreign 
policy was mainly under the prerogative of the president, in line with Article 86 of the 
Russian Constitution of 1993.6 Although the constitutional provisions remained the same, 
Putin’s move to ‘appoint’ Dmitrii Medvedev as a successor to become Head of State 
caused speculations on who was really driving the policy developments. While formally 
democratically elected in the Russian presidential election of 2 March 2008, Medvedev is 
widely believed to have been ruling in tandem with Putin, who obeyed the constitutional 
limit of a maximum of two terms as president and took a step back to become Prime 
Minister.7 Nevertheless, Putin was certainly influential as Prime Minister, and probably the 
                                                        
4 (Barents Euro-Arctic Council n.d.) <http://www.beac.st/en> [Accessed 20 March 2016] 
5 (The Arctic Council 2015) http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-council 
[Accessed 15 March 2016] 
6 Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Article 86, Kremlin, 12 December 2013, 
<http://constitution.kremlin.ru> [accessed 10 March 2016]. 
7 Henry E. Hale and Timothy J. Colton, 'Russians and the Putin-Medvedev "Tandemocracy"', Problems of 
Post-Communism, 57, 2010, 2, pp. 3–20, (p. 3). 
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most influential one in Russian history, but Medvedev was responsible for the strategic 
development of foreign policy.8  
As Putin had pointed to Medvedev as a presidential candidate, an analysis of the 
relation between the two of them can inform the discussion on the changing patterns of 
Russian foreign policy. Both men studied law and came from St. Petersburg, but a major 
difference in their background is that Medvedev never belonged to the group of so-called 
siloviki: well-positioned individuals with backgrounds in the intelligence services.9 Before 
Putin stepped down from the Presidency in 2008, he made significant changes to the 
foreign policy portfolio of what in Russia is called the ‘Power Ministers’, that is, the 
Interior Minister, Defence Minister, but also the chief of the intelligence service. This 
included expanding the scope for the Prime Minister, especially on foreign economic 
relations, while the security portfolio remained in the domain of the president.10  
The so-called ‘tandemocracy’ of Putin and Medvedev has led scholars to debate 
whether Medvedev had any real impact on the development of Russian foreign policy, or 
if his term as Head of State merely consisted of a change in rhetoric. On the one hand, 
Andrew C. Kutchins and Igor A. Zevelev argue that Medvedev did not induce a new 
Russian foreign policy, but that the change was due to the deteriorating economic 
situation following the global financial crisis in 2008–2009.11 Peter J. S. Duncan, on the 
other hand, argues that Medvedev exercized considerable foreign policy autonomy in the 
period from the reset with Barack Obama in February 2009 to September 2011, at which 
time it was clear that Putin would run for election as president.12 Several events under the 
Medvedev presidency point towards a more westward oriented foreign policy, such as the 
new START negotiations with the Americans, cooperation on the Iranian nuclear file, and 
the EU-Russian Partnership for Modernisation.13 
Preceding that, Russia’s relationship to the West had deteriorated by the end of 
Putin’s first term as president, with the Colour Revolutions in the ‘near abroad’ in 
Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan in 2003, 2004 and 2005 respectively, which was seen by 
                                                        
8 Peter J. S. Duncan, 'Batman and Robin? Exploring foreign policy differences between Putin and 
Medvedev during the Medvedev presidency', Working paper ([n.p]: CEPSI - Centre for European Politics, 
Security and Integration, 2013), (p. 19). 
9 Ronald H. Donaldson, Joseph L. Nogee and Vidya Nadkarni, The Foreign Policy of Russia. Changing systems, 
enduring interests (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), p. V.  
10 Duncan 2013, p. 2. 
11 Andrew C. Kutchins and Igor A. Zevelev, 'Russian Foreign Policy: Continuity in Change', The Washington 
Quarterly, 35, 2012, 1, pp. 147–61, p. 156. 
12 Duncan 2013. p. 11. 
13 Donaldson et al., 2015, pp. 407–418. 
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Russia as Western attempts at regime change in its sphere of influence.14 Arguably one of 
the lowest points in Russian-Western relations came in 2008 with the war in Georgia, just 
a few months after Medvedev’s inauguration.15 
Building on Medvedev’s perceived ‘softer’ image than that of Putin, one of the 
new president’s main projects was to implement reforms in order to spur innovation and 
modernize the Russian economy. In his famous article ‘Go Russia!’ from 2009, he warned 
of becoming too dependent on rising oil and gas prices, and addressed the way forward 
towards a knowledge economy, including the development of high-technology industrial 
sectors.16 The speech’s clear emphasis on economic modernisation also had foreign policy 
implications; both in the way he discussed the need for capital and technology from the 
West, but also in the expressed wish of acting and being seen as a respected member of 
the international community.  
Towards the end of the speech, Medvedev declares: ‘We want to establish rules 
of cooperation and dispute settlement, in which priority is given to modern ideas 
of equality and fairness’. The emphasis on international law would prove important in the 
Barents Sea question, which will be discussed later. The Russian population saw 
Medvedev as a liberal, less confrontational and as more open to the West, which 
coincided with the wish of the majority of the Russian population at the time to see ‘the 
West’ as an ally.17 On balance, there was in general a favourable climate for improved 
Russia-Western relations. 
While the president is responsible for foreign policy strategy, the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs works closely with the president to implement it. Sergei Lavrov was 
reappointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2008, known as a highly skilled negotiator and 
seen as a stronger, more assertive holder of the post than his predecessor Ivanov.18 
Having being appointed foreign minister by Putin back in 2004, he represented continuity 
and stability in foreign policy development. He is a career diplomat, and does not belong 
to the aforementioned siloviki group, but nevertheless enjoys Putin’s trust. The work of 
the foreign affairs minister is based on the Foreign Policy Concept, which will be 
discussed in the next section.  
                                                        
14 Jeanne L. Wilson, 'The Legacy of the Color Revolutions for Russian Politics and Foreign Policy', Problems 
of Post-Communism, 57, 2010, 2, pp. 21–36, (p. 21). 
15 Donaldson et al., 2015, p. 298. 
16 Dmitrii A. Medvedev, 'Rossiia, vpered!', Kremlin, <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/5413> 
[accessed 14 March 2016], (para. 10, 33 of 69). 
17 Hale et al., 2010, p. 11. 
18 Donaldson et al., p. 134.  
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III. THE 2008 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY CONCEPT 
The Russian Foreign Policy Concept (hereafter ‘the Concept’) outlines the main official 
priorities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and is produced on a regular basis. The 
Concept from 2008 was prepared under the presidency of Putin, and was adopted just 
after Medvedev became president. For the purpose of this paper, those parts relating to 
key foreign policy concepts and the Barents region will be highlighted below.  
A central theme in Russian foreign policy discourse is the concept of sovereignty, 
which can be seen as a fundamental part of especially Putin’s wish to reassert Russia’s 
position and image as a Great Power. 19  The term is often used to understand the 
challenging Russian-Western relations, but sovereignty has also a very concrete meaning 
when it comes to settlements of border and boundary disputes, as any negotiation over 
territory will involve some form of conceding sovereignty over at least parts of the area. 
‘Sovereignty’ is mentioned several times in the Concept as essential for ensuring Russian 
security and territorial integrity, aiming ‘to achieve strong positions of authority in the 
world community that best meets the interests of the Russian Federation as one of 
influential centers of the modern world.’20 Here, Russia’s view of the world is seen as 
multipolar, with Russia as one of the main actors on the global stage.  
Moreover, the Concept mentions the Barents Region specifically, albeit with no 
reference to the Barents Sea or any negotiations on the delimitation:  
 
‘Russia has been developing onward practical interaction with Nordic 
countries including the implementation within the framework of multi-lateral 
mechanisms of joint cooperation projects in the Barents/Euro-Arctic region 
and the Arctic as a whole with account of the interests of indigenous people’.21  
 
The ‘practical interaction’ refers to the relatively extensive people-to-people 
cooperation in the Northern border region, with visa-free travels, flourishing trade and 
cultural exchange. This special relationship in the north has a pragmatic and practical 
nature, relying on individual contact rather than high-level politics. The document’s sole 
focus on pragmatic cooperation in the region can be seen as an indication of the rather 
                                                        
19 Charles E. Ziegler, 'Conceptualizing sovereignty in Russian foreign policy: Realist and constructivist 
perspectives', International Politics, 49, 2012, 4, pp. 400–417, (pp. 406–407). 
20 Dmitrii A. Medvedev, 'The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation', 2008, (p. 1). 
21 Ibid., p. 5.  
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passive outlook for a resolution of the Barents Sea question, as there are no signs in the 
Concept that a deal was in the making. 
Even though the Concept was prepared before Medvedev came to power, an 
example of the increased focus on economic development can be seen in the paragraph 
on national interests, where the relations to Norway is mentioned specifically:  
 
The development of mutually advantageous bilateral relationships with 
Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Finland, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway and 
some other West-European states is an important resource for promoting 
Russia’s national interests in the European and world affairs, as well as 
contributing to putting the Russian economy on an innovative track of 
development. 22 
 
Here, as in his ‘Go Russia!’ speech, the use of foreign policy towards Western 
countries is conceived of as a tool for implementing the economic modernisation plan in 
an attempt to attract technology and foreign direct investments, in line with Medvedev’s 
economic programme. 
The role of international law in resolving the Barents Sea question will be 
discussed in greater detail later, but it is worth noting its place in the Concept of 2008. 
Under the chapter ‘The primacy of international law’, the need for legalisation of maritime 
boundaries is mentioned specifically: 
 
Work to finalize the international legalization of the (…) boundaries of the 
maritime zone over which it exercises its sovereign rights and jurisdiction 
while ensuring the unconditional observance of Russian national interests, 
primarily those related to security and economy, with a view to build up trust 
and cooperation with adjoining states.23 
 
While the paragraph above states a wish to conclude the borders and boundaries 
of the Russian Federation, the mentioning of ‘unconditional observance’ of Russian 
security and economic interests stands in contrast to the compromises that are necessary 
in order to conclude boundary treaties under international law. However, it could be in 
Russia's national interest to resolve the Barents Sea boundary dispute in spite of the need 
to compromise and concede territory to Norway, as the lack of a settlement hampers the 
                                                        
22 Ibid., p. 5. 
23 Ibid., p. 3. 
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economic potential and might possibly result in increasing security risks in the north. The 
next section will outline the principal interests of the Russian Federation in the Barents 
Sea. 
IV. RUSSIA’S MAIN NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE BARENTS SEA 
Russia has primarily two main interests in the region, both of which are outlined in the 
Arctic Strategy of the Russian Federation of 2008: economic interests in the oil and gas 
sector, fishery and transportation, in addition to political and military interests in the 
Arctic region related to defence of territories and borders.24 However, in a wider sense, 
national interests are not limited to material ones; Russia’s interests in the Barents region 
are also connected to how the cooperative path is viewed by neighbouring countries and 
the West, great power projection and national identity. This section will mainly focus on 
the material interests, while the question of changes in the relationship with the West is 
discussed later.  
Russia has strong economic interests in the Barents region, which is denoted by its 
‘strategic resource base’ in the Russian Arctic Strategy, as the area is estimated to contain 
vast energy resources. An estimation of around 80 per cent of Russia’s unexploited oil and 
gas reserves are in the Arctic region, and the oil and gas fields in the Barents Sea are 
among the lower hanging fruits in terms of energy exploitation in the area. In a 2008 US 
Geological Survey it was estimated that the technically recoverable oil equivalent reserves 
on the continental shelf in the Barents Sea are estimated around 76 billion barrels, in 
addition to the fields that were already discovered.25 An illustration of the estimated oil 
and gas deposits can be seen below in Map 1. The size of the dark blue areas illustrates 
the estimated size of the oil and gas reserves, with the fields already in development and 
an indication of the disputed area. However, it must be added that there is still high 
uncertainty regarding the estimates as to the actual deposits in the Barents Sea. 
Cooperation on oil and gas drilling and exploitation in Arctic waters would bring 
technology and know-how to Russian companies, which would be in line with 
                                                        
24 Dmitrii A. Medvedev, 'Osnovy gosudarstvennoi politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii v Arktike na period do 2020 
goda i dal'neishuyu perspektivu', in Soviet besopasnosti Rossiiskaia Federatsia 
<http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/98.html> [accessed 10 February 2016], section II. 
25 T. R. Klett and D. L. Gautier, 'Assessment of undiscovered petroleum resources of the Barents Sea Shelf: 
U.S. Geological Survey Fact Sheet', US Geological Survey, 2009, <http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2009/3037/> 
[accessed 15 March 2016], (p. 1). 
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Medvedev’s wish to modernize the economy and create an environment conducive to 
innovation and growth. Deep water drilling and Arctic exploration are already areas where 
Norway has long experience and a comparative advantage in, and Russia could be able to 
capitalize on that if there were any joint exploration projects as a consequence of the 
boundary agreement. 
Furthermore, there are large fish stocks in the area: cod, halibut, capelin and 
haddock are plentiful in the Barents Sea. In the absence of a permanent boundary 
agreement there was a need for coordination of fishing quotas and third-party vessels, the 
Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission was set up to govern fishery and marine 
resource management since 1976 in a bilateral agreement between Norway and the Soviet 
Union, and later Russia.26 The aim was to reduce overfishing and manage the fish stocks 
in one of the largest marine ecosystems in the world.  




From a security perspective, the Arctic Strategy mentions the high north as a 
‘zone for peace and cooperation’. However, the favourable ice conditions in the Barents 
Sea make the Kola Peninsula an ideal geo-strategic location for one of Russia’s naval 
fleets, the ‘Northern Fleet’ in Severomorsk. Historically one of the world’s largest in 
Soviet times; it was placed in the far North because it was possible to navigate to the 
Atlantic and Arctic Oceans and move to Asia and America, not because tensions were 
                                                        
26 Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission, 'The fisheries commission' 
<http://www.jointfish.com/eng/THE-FISHERIES-COMMISSION> [accessed 15 March 2016]. 
27 Atle Staalesen, 'Zarubezhneft wants Fedinsky High', Barents Observer 
<http://barentsobserver.com/en/articles/zarubezhneft-wants-fedinsky-high> [accessed 21 March 2016]. 
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higher up North.28 The Arctic region has traditionally been the stage for the development 
of Russia’s nuclear capabilities, whereas it now serves as the ‘resource power base’. 
Though generally a peaceful border region, the presence of strong military 
capabilities on the Russian side of the border combined with repeated NATO drills on 
the Norwegian side have been a cause for wider security concerns. Occasionally, Russian 
strategic bomber flights patrol the Norwegian coast, and the activity reached a post-Cold 
War high in 2008 with 97 incidents, up from 14 in 2006, followed by an ensuing decline in 
activity.29 
The potentially military threats from Russia in the north must be seen in relation 
to the developments in defence spending in the last decades. After the break-up of the 
Soviet Union, Russia’s military capacity quickly deteriorated, and reached a low point in 
the 1990s. Since 2000, Putin began increasing the spending on the military-industrial 
complex, as it could be financed by the growing energy prices. While Russia has more 
pressing security concerns elsewhere along its other borders, it is still upgrading the 
Northern Fleet with smaller vessels. However, the general trend has been going towards 
de-securitisation of Russian Arctic policy, and as Kristian Åtland argues, one should not 
exaggerate the conflicts in the Arctic.30 
Both the military and economic interests are expected to be highly affected by the 
increasing impact of climate change. Higher average temperatures above the Arctic Circle 
lead to faster ice melting, which at some point in time will open up a transportation route 
in the High North.31 Potential ice-free ports along the Russian Arctic will open up for a 
Northeast Passage as a secure transportation route from Europe and the US to Asia. If 
the route was opened for transportation, it would have both military and economic 
impact. The establishment of a permanent ice-free Northeast Passage will open up 
commercial traffic and goods transportation, on a route almost solely controlled by 
Russia. The opening up of the Northern Passage is likely to spur economic growth in the 
Russian Arctic. 
However, other environmental issues have negative impact on Russian interests in 
the region. Drilling and exploring in the fragile Barents Sea is controversial, as oil spills in 
the vulnerable Arctic climate zone would have potentially catastrophically effects on the 
                                                        
28 Kristian Åtland, 'Russia's Armed Forces and the Arctic: All Quiet on the Northern Front?', Contemporary 
Security Policy, 32, 26 August 2011, 2, pp. 267–85. (p. 268). 
29 Christian Le Mière and Jeffrey Mazo, Arctic opening. Insecurity and opportunity, First Edition (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2013), p. 86. 
30 Åtland, 2011, p. 268. 
31 Le Mière and Mazo, 2013, pp. 69–70. 
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wild life and environment. It would be especially disastrous if there was an oil leak close 
to the ice edge, but this risk will be lower if the Arctic would be permanently ice-free.  
V. BACKGROUND AND TIMELINE OF THE TREATY NEGOTIATIONS 
On 15 September 2010, the Boundary Agreement was signed in Murmansk between the 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov and Jonas Gahr Støre in the presence of 
President Medvedev and the Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg.32 After having 
been ratified by the Russian Duma and the Norwegian Parliament, it entered into force as 
of 7 July 2011. In a joint statement following the signing of the treaty, Støre and Lavrov 
described the outcome as ‘a line that divides the overall disputed area in two parts of 
approximately the same size’.33 
The treaty settled a long-standing question: How should the boundary be 
measured? As outlined by Ingvild Kvalsvik, Norway had called for negotiations with the 
Soviet Union over the so-called ‘Grey Zone’ in the Barents Sea since 1967.34 The official 
negotiations began from 1974, and an agreement was reached on 11 January 1978 purely 
on practical arrangements for the governing of marine resources in the area. The Grey 
Zone Agreement provided a framework for jurisdiction on third-party vessels in the area, 
subject to renewal on an annual basis. However, the dispute remained unresolved. The 
agreement was supposed to be temporary, but lasted almost 30 years before the dispute 
was finally settled and the ‘temporary’ Grey Zone agreement could be terminated.  
In tandem with the Soviet-Norwegian Barents Sea negotiations, there were 
substantial developments in international law that could provide useful tools for resolving 
the dispute. After a change in the Law of the Sea following the UN Convention of the 
Law of the Sea (hereafter UNCLOS) from 1974–1982, the UN adopted a principle of 200 
nautical miles from the mainland as a boundary for the sovereignty of coastal states to the 
                                                        
32 'Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation concerning Maritime Delimitation 
and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean’, 10 September 2010. 
33 Jonas G. Støre and Sergey Lavrov, 'Joint Statement on maritime delimitation and cooperation in the 
Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean', Government of Norway, 27 April 2010, < 
https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Folkerett/030427_english_4.pdf> 
[accessed 3 March 2016], p. 2. 
34 Ingvild Kvalsvik, 'Assessing the delimitation negotiations between Norway and the Soviet Union/Russia', 
Acta Borelia, 2004, pp. 55–78 (p. 62). 
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right to manage marine resources. 35  Moreover, the establishment of an Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) gives coastal states not only the right to decide how resources 
should be used, but also the duty to manage them sustainably in line with principles of 
environmental protection. UNCLOS went into force in 1994, with more than 160 
countries ratifying the convention, including Norway and Russia.  
Although it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss all the aspects of 
UNCLOS, there are especially two concepts that are important for an understanding of 
the dispute in the Barents Sea. As defined in UNCLOS, the median principle is a line that 
follows the equidistance between the coastlines of two countries. The sector principle 
follows the meridian line from a coastal point of a country to the North Pole, thereby 
creating a sector, which is the basis for boundary delimitations in the Arctic.  
It was the median principle that Norway had been advocating for in the Barents 
Sea question, whereas the Soviet Union and later Russia wanted the sector line principle 
to be applied. The two positions are drawn up in Map 1 as seen below. The Russian 
proposal for a sector line would not be strictly straight, as it needs to account for 
Norway’s sovereignty of its EEZ surrounding the Svalbard islands. Whereas both 
countries had argued for the application of UNCLOS, the Soviet Union put forward a 
claim to use the provision for ‘special circumstances’ because of its special interests in the 
region, namely its military bases and a considerable population. 36  This claim was 
repeatedly refused by Norway. As seen from Map 2, the implication of this difference was 
that an area of approximately 176,000 km2 would fall on Russian or Norwegian hands. 
New bilateral negotiations began again in 2005, and the so-called ‘Varanger Agreement’ 
was signed in 2007, which was an important stepping-stone for the conclusion of the final 
delimitation three years later. The Varanger Agreement settled the question of the 
placement of the delimitation 70 km north of the coastline.  
 
Map 2: Map of the disputed area with the median line, the sectorial line and the grey zone.37 
 
                                                        
35 United Nations, 'United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea', United Nations, 10 December 1982, 
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf> [accessed 3 March 
2016]. 
36 Arild Moe, Daniel Fjærtoft and Indra Øverland, 'Space and Timing: Why was the Barents Sea 
Delimitation Dispute Resolved in 2010?', Polar Geography, 34, 2011, 3, pp. 145–62 (p. 3). 
37 Heather Exner-Pirot, 'Norway and Russia Sign Treaty to End Boundary Dispute in Barents Sea', Eye on the 
Arctic, 16 September 2010, <http://www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2010/09/16/norway-and-russia-sign-
treaty-to-end-boundary-dispute-in-barents-sea/> [accessed 15 March 2016]. 
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The agreement does not only establish the sea boundary between Norway and 
Russia, but it also offers a comprehensive agreement on how to manage fishery resources, 
hydrocarbon deposits and other aspects of Russian-Norwegian relations in the Barents 
Sea. An expression of the compromise element of the agreement, Article 5 in the Treaty 
also includes a so-called ‘Unitisation Agreement’, whereby disputes over oil and gas 
exploration and field development on the continental shelf shall be resolved in unity, that 
is, the field shall be developed and exploited in cooperation with the two parties to the 
treaty.  
VI. THE EVOLUTION OF THIS POLICY, AND THE RESULTS  
The successful conclusion of the boundary agreement came as a surprise to most experts, 
with no information leaking from the negotiations and only a few people within the 
Russian and Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs respectively knowing about it. 38 
Furthermore, official reports and scholarly papers written as late as 2007 express 
pessimistic views on how soon an agreement could be reached, if it could be reached at 
                                                        
38 Moe et al., 2011, p. 151. 
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all. In a report prepared by the Research Services Section of the Norwegian Parliament in 
2007, there is no mention of a realistic prospect of reaching a solution, even given the fact 
that the Varanger Agreement was reached the very same year.39 
During the almost 40-year long dispute, both parties emphasized the importance 
of reaching a strong and sustainable agreement, a preferred approach over pressing for a 
solution just for the sake of reaching an agreement. Not only did it take many decades of 
negotiations to come to a conclusion, but also statements from both parties to the conflict 
indicate that the quality of the deal was more important than a hurried settlement. ‘Both 
parties will take the time they need to come to a solution’ Norwegian negotiation leader 
Rolf Einar Fife emphasized.40 
Moreover, the Barents Sea is not even mentioned in the Russian Foreign Policy 
Concept of 2008, published only two years before the deal was signed. So in that case, 
why was an agreement reached precisely in 2010? For the timing of the dispute resolution, 
Arild Moe et al. argue that it primarily has to be analysed from the perspective of 
developments in Russian domestic policies and changing patterns of Russian foreign 
policy.41 Both countries had more or less advocated the same positions since the dispute 
arose in the 1970s, so the signing of the agreement should be seen as an expression of 
increased willingness to reach an equitable solution. The Cold War era was not conducive 
to a favourable negotiation environment, and in the 1990s, there was no urgent needs to 
reach a conclusion to the boundary question, as fishery issues were already governed 
under the Joint Fishery Commission set up in the 1970s.42 
As shown above, after two periods of shifting and challenging relations for 
Western-Russian relations under President Putin, Medvedev wanted Russia to be seen as a 
constructive partner for the West. From that perspective, the change in position over the 
Barents Sea question can be seen as a general change in the role of international law in 
Russian foreign policy. Mankoff argues that Russian foreign policy is built on the fact that 
‘large states are (…) free to pursue national interests and [the] rejection of universal 
                                                        
39 Stortingets Utredningsseksjon, 'Delelinjen i Barentshavet: Planlagt samarbeid versus uforutsett konflikt?', 
Stortingets Utredningsseksjon, April 2007, 
<https://www.stortinget.no/Global/pdf/Utredning/Perspektiv07_04.pdf> [accessed 13 February 2016], 
pp. 1–30. 
40 Geir Seljeseth, 'Fremdrift om delelinjen', Nordlys, 5 December 2005, 
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41 Moe et al., 2011, pp. 153–154. 
42 Kvalsvik, 2004, p. 61. 
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principles in favour of respecting states’ sovereignty.’43 However, the role of international 
law in the Barents Sea question contradicts this view.  
On the contrary, the Barents Sea Boundary Agreement offered an opportunity for 
settling a long-standing dispute with a Western NATO country based on universally 
recognized international laws. This even meant that Russia was conceding claims to 
sovereignty of approximately half of the disputed area, which again can be viewed as a 
way of showing the world that Russia was willing to negotiate and reach equitable 
resolutions to conflicts based on compromise, in spite of the ‘sovereignty’ concept being a 
key foreign policy principle that Russia consistently refers to in its public discourse. The 
method used for determining the boundary might also serve as a reference for future sea 
delimitation agreements and can be used again in other disputed areas in the Arctic and 
elsewhere. 
Although the border region has historically been stable, there had been tendencies 
of tensions in the recent past, as noted earlier. By signing a treaty, the two countries had 
committed themselves to a path of de-escalation and showed a willingness to lower the 
tensions and avoid future potential conflicts. 
Another reason can be found in the energy sector: Without a permanent 
agreement in the Barents Sea, it would be difficult to explore the oil and gas fields in the 
area, as a moratorium on drilling and exploration was agreed in the 1980s. The evolution 
of energy prices and Russia’s dependence on oil and gas exports help explain the necessity 
of opening new fields. Crude oil prices peaked at around $145 per barrel in 2008 when 
Medvedev assumed office, and plummeted to $43 per barrel a year later before quickly 
picking up again to around $80 when the treaty was signed in September 2010.44 As most 
of the cheap oil and gas from the Soviet times were already on the verge of being fully 
exploited, there was a renewed appetite for developing new fields.  
The energy aspect was also emphasized by Medvedev in the joint press conference 
with Stoltenberg after the treaty was signed, although mostly in general terms without 
specific reference to development and exploration. 45  Before being elected President, 
Medvedev had himself been Chairperson of the Board of Gazprom, which was one of the 
                                                        
43 Jeffrey Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy. The return of great power politics, 2nd Edition, (Lanham, MD: Rowman 
& Littlefield, 2012), p. 15. 
44 Trading Economics, 'Crude oil historical data', Trading Economics Commodites, 
<http://www.tradingeconomics.com/commodity/crude-oil> [accessed 16 March 2016]. 
45 Jens Stoltenberg and Dmitrii A. Medvedev, 'Sovmestnaia press-konferentiia po itogam rossiisko-
norvezhkikh peregovorov', Kremlin, 15 September 2010, 
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two companies that had been granted exploration licenses in the Barents Sea, the other 
company being Rosneft.  
Despite these facts, Moe et al. argue that the energy aspect was not a major driver 
for the change in Russia’s position on the Barents Sea.46 However, given the economic 
turmoil in 1990s that ended in a subsequent crash and default in 1998, and revenue being 
so dependent on energy prices, one cannot ignore Russian interests in the oil and gas 
market. With oil and gas prices sky rocketing in the 2000s and providing much-needed 
liquidity and revenue for the Russian national budget, it seems likely to have been a 
significant factor for the timing of the dispute resolution. Politically, the higher revenues 
enabled Putin to implement necessary policies and repay foreign debt accrued under the 
1998 financial crisis, and the Russian population enjoyed a decade of rising living 
standards. The careful provisions for exploitation of hydrocarbon deposits in the Treaty 
as found in Article 5 and Annex II further indicate the importance placed on the energy 
aspect of the deal by both parties.  
Nevertheless, the development of the oil and gas industry in the Barents Sea has 
been slower than expected. The mean lag of thirteen years in the Arctic that it takes from 
start of exploration to the oil and gas hit the market can be attributable to the high costs 
of drilling in the Arctic, weak existing infrastructure and delays in licensing due to 
domestic and international environmental laws.47 Although not directly affected by the 
boundary treaty as it is on the Russian side of the Barents Sea, the Shtokman field serves 
as an example of how costly and difficult it is to develop oil fields above the Arctic Circle. 
As one of the largest gas reserves in the world discovered in 1988, it was scheduled to be 
developed in 2007 by a joint venture owned 51 per cent by the Russian state-owned oil 
company Gazprom, 25 per cent by French Total and 24 per cent by Norwegian Statoil. 
However, the project came to an end in 2012 when soaring costs and falling European 
demand led Statoil to hand over its shares.48 Additionally, Statoil and Rosneft have drilled 
exploratory wells in the northern parts of the Barents Sea, but both are under pressure 
from environmental protection organisations, as the consequences of a potential oil spill 
are very severe to the fragile eco system.49 
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CONCLUSION 
When the Barents Sea Boundary Agreement was settled in 2010, it resolved one of the 
most difficult challenges in Norwegian-Russian relations, and put an end to the forty-year 
long dispute over sea delimitation and marine resource management. Medvedev’s time as 
president of the Russian Federation was limited to one term from 2008 to 2012, when he 
took up the premiership and Putin returned to the presidency. The handover from Putin 
to Medvedev constituted not only a change in rhetoric, but also a change in substance. 
This paper has argued that the Boundary Agreement serves as a case to illustrate such a 
shift towards a more cooperative foreign policy.  
The Barents Sea Treaty was not only important logistically, but also symbolically, 
illustrating a more consistently cooperative foreign policy course under president 
Medvedev. The settlement of the boundary delimitation can be used as an example for 
other disputed sea areas in the Arctic and elsewhere, demonstrating the significance of the 
Law of the Sea and peaceful negotiations as a means of settling long-standing disputes. 
The inherent symbols of the compromises made by a ‘large’ nation such as Russia 
towards a ‘small’ country like Norway should also be recognized, although concessions 
were made on both sides. This is particularly interesting in the analysis of Russian foreign 
policy, given the traditional emphasis on state sovereignty.  
Although there was a strong focus on the economic gains from the development 
of the oil and gas fields in the Barents Sea at the time of the conclusion of the agreement, 
there is still little evidence of successful advancements in the energy sector. The expected 
rush of field developments has not materialized to the extent that was expected at the 
time. More recently, the plummeting oil prices since December 2014 have probably made 
many of the already costly Barents Sea projects unprofitable, and sanctions imposed on 
the Russian economy have further strained the already vulnerable national budget, 
capping the resources necessary to invest in technology and infrastructure.50 
Several factors contributed to the favourable conditions under which the deal was 
signed. One of them arguably was the increased growth in oil and gas prices and the wish 
to expand the Russian economy by developing high-technological expertise in the North. 
Another was the desire to be seen as a more constructive partner to the West, reverting to 
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international law, negotiations and compromises. The foreign policy legacy of Medvedev 
is characterized by a change in rhetoric towards being less confrontational in relations 
with the West. A stronger emphasis was laid on international law for governing 
international questions in a multipolar world and a focus on foreign policy as a tool for 
economic modernisation. The Barents Sea Boundary Agreement provides a good example 

























This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 
International License. This license lets others remix, tweak, and build upon the author’s work non-
commercially, as long as they credit the author and license their new creations under the identical terms. To 
view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/. 
44 GRØHOLT – FROM CONFLICTUAL TO COOPERATIVE APPROACHES IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN 
POLICY – AN EXAMINATION OF THE BARENTS SEA BOUNDARY AGREEMENT 
© School of Slavonic and Eastern European Studies, University College London, 2016.  
REFERENCES 
Arctic Council, The Arctic Council, 15 September 2015, <http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-council> [accessed March 15 2016]. 
 
Åtland, Kristian, 'Russia's Armed Forces and the Arctic: All Quiet on the Northern 
Front?', Contemporary Security Policy, 32, 26 August 2011, 2, pp. 267–285. 
 
Barents Euro-Arctic Council, Barents Euro-Arctic Council, 2016, <http://www.beac.st/en> 
[accessed February 1 2016]. 
 
Bigg, Clare, Russia: Trawler Escapes Norwegian Coast Guard While Still Carrying Inspectors, 19 
October 2005, <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1062253.html> [accessed March 
15 2016]. 
 
Donaldson, Robert H., Joseph L. Nogee, and Vidya Nadkarni, The Foreign Policy of Russia, 
Fifth Edition, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015). 
 
Duncan, Peter J. S, 'Batman and Robin? Exploring foreign policy differences between 
Putin and Medvedev during the Medvedev presidency', Working paper, ([n.p]: CEPSI - 
Centre for European Politics, Security and Integration, 2013), 2013. 
 
Exner-Pirot, Heather, 'Norway and Russia Sign Treaty to End Boundary Dispute in 
Barents Sea', Eye on the Arctic, 16 September 2010, <http://www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-
arctic/2010/09/16/norway-and-russia-sign-treaty-to-end-boundary-dispute-in-barents-
sea/> [accessed March 15 2016]. 
 
Hale, Henry E., and Timothy J. Colton, 'Russians and the Putin-Medvedev 
"Tandemocracy"', Problems of Post-Communism, 57, 2010, 2, pp. 3–20. 
 
Hoel, Alf Håkon, 'The 2010 Norway – Russia marine boundary agreement and bilateral 
cooperation on integrated oceans management', Nordlit, 29, 1 May 2012, pp. 15–27. 
 
45 GRØHOLT – FROM CONFLICTUAL TO COOPERATIVE APPROACHES IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN 
POLICY – AN EXAMINATION OF THE BARENTS SEA BOUNDARY AGREEMENT 
© School of Slavonic and Eastern European Studies, University College London, 2016.  
International Insttute for Strategic Studies, 'Negative outlook for Russian economy as 
sanctions bite', Strategic Comments, 10 March 2015, 
<http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/strategic%20comments/sections/2015-
1f4d/negative-outlook-for-russian-economy-as-sanctions-bite-4b7c> [accessed 15 March 
2016]. 
 
Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission, The fisheries commission, 
http://www.jointfish.com/eng/THE-FISHERIES-COMMISSION [accessed March 15 
2016]. 
 
Klett, T. R., and D. L. Gautier, 'Assessment of undiscovered petroleum resources of the 
Barents Sea Shelf: U.S. Geological Survey Fact Sheet', US Geological Survey, 2009, 
<http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2009/3037/> [accessed March 15 2016]. 
 
Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 12 December 1993, <http://constitution.kremlin.ru> 
[accessed March 10 2016]. 
 
Kutchins, Andrew C., and Igor A. Zevelev, 'Russian Foreign Policy: Continuity in 
Change', The Washington Quarterly, 35, 2012, 1, pp. 147–161. 
 
Kvalsvik, Ingvild, 'Assessing the delimitation negotiations between Norway and the Soviet 
Union/Russia', Acta Borelia, 21, 2004, 1, pp. 55–78. 
 
Laruelle, Marlene, Russia’s Arctic Strategies and the Future of the Far North, (Armonk, NY: M. 
E. Sharpe, 2014). 
 
Le Mière, Christian, and Jeffrey Mazo, Arctic opening. Insecurity and opportunity, 1st Edition 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2013). 
 
Macalister, Terry, Plug pulled on Russia's flagship Shtokman energy project, 29 August 2012, 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/aug/29/shtokman-russia-arctic-gas-shale> 
[accessed March 21 2016]. 
 
46 GRØHOLT – FROM CONFLICTUAL TO COOPERATIVE APPROACHES IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN 
POLICY – AN EXAMINATION OF THE BARENTS SEA BOUNDARY AGREEMENT 
© School of Slavonic and Eastern European Studies, University College London, 2016.  
Mankoff, Jeffrey, Russian Foreign Policy. The return of great power politics, 2nd Edition (Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012). 
 
Medvedev, Dmitrii A, Osnovy gosudarstvennoi politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii v Arktike na period do 
2020 goda i dal'neishuyu perspektivu, 18 September 2008, 
<http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/98.html> [accessed February 10 2016]. 
 
Medvedev, Dmitrii, Rossiia, vpered!, 10 September 2009, 
<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/5413> [accessed March 14 2016]. 
 
Medvedev, Dmitrii, 'The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation', 12 July 2008. 
 
Moe, Arild, Daniel Fjærtoft, and Indra Øverland, 'Space and Timing: Why was the 
Barents Sea Delimitation Dispute Resolved in 2010?', Polar Geography, 34, 2011, 3, pp. 
145–162. 
 
Nilsen, Thomas, Large NATO exercise starts in Northern Norway, Barents Observer, 18 
February 2010, <http://barentsobserver.com/en/sections/articles/large-nato-exercise-
starts-northern-norway> [accessed March 16 2016]. 
 
Seljeseth, Geir, Fremdrift om delelinjen, 5 December 2005, 
<http://www.nordlys.no/nyheter/fremdrift-om-delelinjen/s/1-79-1856391> [accessed 
March 21 2016]. 
 
Staalesen, Atle, Zarubezhneft wants Fedinsky High, 21 June 2011, 
<http://barentsobserver.com/en/articles/zarubezhneft-wants-fedinsky-high> [accessed 
March 21 2016]. 
 
Støre, Jonas G., and Sergey Lavrov, 'Joint Statement on maritime delimitation and 
cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean', Government of Norway, 27 April 2010, 
<https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/ud/vedlegg/folkerett/030427_englis
h_4.pdf> [accessed March 3 2016]. 
 
47 GRØHOLT – FROM CONFLICTUAL TO COOPERATIVE APPROACHES IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN 
POLICY – AN EXAMINATION OF THE BARENTS SEA BOUNDARY AGREEMENT 
© School of Slavonic and Eastern European Studies, University College London, 2016.  
Steiner, Rick, 'Norway's offshore drilling puts Arctic Ocean at risk', Greenpeace, 22 August 
2014, <http://www.greenpeace.org.uk/blog/climate/norways-offshore-drilling-puts-
arctic-ocean-risk-20140822> [accessed March 15 2016]. 
 
Stoltenberg, Jens, and Dmitrii A. Medvedev, 'Sovmestnaia press-konferentiia po itogam 
rossiisko-norvezhkikh peregovorov', Kremlin, 15 September 2010, 
<http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/8924> [accessed March 6 2016]. 
 
Stortingets Utredningsseksjon, 'Delelinjen i Barentshavet: Planlagt samarbeid versus 
uforutsett konflikt?' Stortingets Utredningsseksjon, April 2007, 
<https://www.stortinget.no/Global/pdf/Utredning/Perspektiv07_04.pdf> [accessed 
February 13 2016]. 
 
Trading Economics, Crude oil historical data, 16 March 2016, 
<http://www.tradingeconomics.com/commodity/crude-oil> [accessed March 16 2016]. 
 
Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation concerning Maritime Delimitation 
and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean, (Murmansk, 10 September 2010). 
 
Tsygankov, Andrei P, Russia's Foreign Policy, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013). 
 
United Nations, 'United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea', United Nations, 10 
December 1982, 
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf> 
[accessed March 3 2016]. 
 
Wilson, Jeanne L, 'The Legacy of the Color Revolutions for Russian Politics and Foreign 
Policy', Problems of Post-Communism, 57, 2010, 2, pp. 21–36. 
 
Ziegler, Charles E., 'Conceptualizing sovereignty in Russian foreign policy: Realist and 
constructivist perspectives', International Politics, 49, 2012, 4, pp. 400–417. 
